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Knowing the Soviet Union: The Historical Dimension 
By Dr. Robert Conquest 
Soviet history has, of course, been massively falsified. But it has always been 
possible to dig out the truth; and by now there is nothing left that is substantially a secret. 
We do not know every fact, and anyone can still dig up lots of exotic detail. In general, 
however, we know what went on right from the beginning. The question of "what we 
know about Soviet history" is thus twofold: the first part covers "what is known," which, 
as I say, is a lot; and the second part asks "whom does the word 'we' include?" There are 
people in the West, more than in the East, who are unable to know the Soviet Union's 
history. This includes academics, perhaps I should say especiallv academics. 
Not knowing Soviet history is one of the great phenomena of our time. I think 
that , as a political comment, it is also worth registering the strange notion that all the 
problems between the West and the Soviet Union are due to neither of us understanding the 
other. This is essentially untrue. U.S.-Soviet relations have always been good when the 
United States misunderstood the USSR. In 1945, when Roosevelt and others thought of 
Stalin as a co-operative member of a peaceful world order, the United States had excellent 
relations with the Soviet Union. Later, when Carter, as he told us, had misunderstood the 
Soviet Union prior to the invasion of Afghanistan, U.S .-Soviet relations also were fine. 
These well-intentioned blunders cannot last long, at least not with politicians who 
have to live in the real world. However, they can last in the crevices of historiography. 
And what is it that impedes our knowledge of he Soviet Union? First, especially during the 
period since 1929 there was a great effort on Stalin's part to suppress the truth, and to 
publish falsehood. (Incidentally, the two are not quite the same thing.) Reports regarding 
the terror famine of 1933 were suppressed. It was denied that the famine was occurring 
and later that it had happened. A Soviet novelist wrote a couple of years ago: "In not a 
single textbook of contemporary history will you find the merest reference to 1933, the 
year marked by a terrible tragedy." 
Of course this negative suppression was aided by Western commentators like 
Walter Duranty from The New York Times. Incidentally, in Harrison Salisbury's last 
book, there is a chapter on Duranty. I had always thought that Duranty might have had 
some political motives for his denial of the 1933 famine. Apparently, that was not the case 
at all. Only sheer vanity and careerism. He was not a left-winger. But either way, we 
had the waters muddied by the truth only corning out indirectly, being denied by the Soviet 
authorities and that denial being supported by some supposed experts . The result was that 
the public became very confused. 
In addition, of course, to suppression of evidence, we had active falsification. One 
need hardly go into that. The supreme example concerned the three great trials of 1936 to 
1938, which were total fakes. 
There is a third major element against which the historian must be on guard. It can 
be characterized as neither suppression nor fal sific ation alone. This aspect can be 
demonstrated by address ing the question whether there were millions executed or sent to 
murderous labor camps during the Stalin period. The official line was not total denial, but 
the admission that there were some, not many, individuals , who had been justly executed 
and some, though not many, who were sent to corrective labor camps. This line was 
sustained, some might say, by not allowing Western visitors to the huge GULAG areas , 
but even that is not quite true. Vice President Wallace and Professor Latimore spent a day 
or two in the frightful Kolyma labor complex, saw nothing, and reported enthusias tically. 
To counter such stuff, all we had was a vast amount of first-hand evidence from prisoners. 
By the late 1940s, we already had at our disposal full and fairly detailed accounts of the 
nature and extent of the labor camp system, published by David Dallin, Boris Nicolaevsky, 
and others. 
There are other terror aspects concerning which knowledge was not readily 
obtained. What happened to the Central Committee members, including Politburo figures 
and generals, whose names simply ceased to be mentioned? This was not, for some 
reason, treated as odd by Western authors who wrote about this period. Or take the murder 
of Sergei Kirov. It was not clear to Western writers whether Stalin was guilty, as 
Khrushchev strongly hinted. Even now the Soviet Union is having great difficulty with 
this issue. Obtaining the whole truth is like pulling out a wisdom tooth. The latest 
development in Moscow involved a prosecutor who gave a press conference recently. He 
was asked about Yagoda, the former Chief of the Soviet Secret Police. He said that the 
Soviet authorities had definite evidence indicating that Yagoda was involved in Kirov's 
murder. He was also asked whether Stalin had been involved. He said he would rather 
not speculate. That is not exactly a very strong denial. In fact, one or two odd comers in 
the Soviet press have actually stated that Stalin had been involved, but they have not quite 
announced it officially yet. It may be because the question of Stalin's involvement is also 
a moral problem. It undermines even further the moral foundations of Stalinism to say that 
he killed his alleged best friend and then blamed everyone else for it. It is worse than to 
have him kill millions of human beings or political enemies. One can kill millions and still 
be considered a great man. A leader can be said to have risen through blood to create a 
new society, and to have killed his enemies in the process -- why not? But killing your 
friends in an underhanded way does undermine Stalin 's last remnant of prestige with the 
Party and that is why, I think, the authorities were having great difficulty admitting this 
fact. 
By the mid-1950s, most serious students of Soviet history had the main body of the 
truth , including the Kirov case. Only very few individuals were disputing it. The 
Khrushchev interlude from 1956 ro 1964 seemed to put it past argument. But one should 
never underrate the survivability of certain types of false argument in academia; George 
Orwell once wrote that one had to be an intellectual to believe certain absurdities because no 
ordinary man could be such a fool. Khrushchev made it clear, in the so-called "secret 
speech" of February 1956, that Stalin had indeed tortured people, issued instructions to 
torture and slaughter Party leaders and generals, and so on. He did not go further, but 
some memoirs came out in the Soviet Union confirming the GULAG horrors. 
There are other such long obfuscated areas of Soviet history, apart form the main 
themes of Stalinism. I wrote my first book on the disappearance from the map of a number 
of nationalities in the Caucasus. It made me curious, I investigated the topic and finally 
wrote a book called The Nation Killers. Subsequently, I became interested in the then 
unresearched story of the political struggle in the Politburo. On the surface, the Soviet 
Party leadership seemed to be characterized by total unanimity. But this appearance was 
broken every few years by disappearances, executions, and expulsions. The factional 
struggle continued, and I dealt with it in my Power and Policy in the USSR. 
As an aside, it should be said here, that, in my opinion, the one pitfall to be 
avoided in dealing with the struggle in the Kremlin is "political science." I dislike 
"methodology," "models ," "parameters," and "paradigms." The State Department has 
been commissioning mathematical treatments of the present-day situation in the Politburo 
and the future prospects of the Soviet Union, employing political scientists who admittedly 
know nothing about the Soviet Union. However, supposedly they know about politics . 
They go and seek information from experts on the Soviet Union. Then they enter it into a 
machine, quantify it and weigh it. It is hoped, I presume, that the machine will give us the 
name of the next General Secretary. I am not sure how it is supposed to work. 
There is an experiment I accidentally came across . A real expert on Soviet foreign 
policy was approached by a graduate student working for a political scientist, with a 20-
page questionnaire on the Cuban missile crisis. He commented, "Why should I spend two 
hours filling this in?" He then asked the researcher, "What are you going to do with it?" 
She said that when all the answers were in they would be "processed." It would then be 
determined that 100 experts on Soviet diplomacy rated the chances of war, say, the highest 
- --------
79, the lowest 3 percent. When averaged out one would find that the chance of war was 
perhaps 37.4937 percent. Of course, such an approach does not always work. If you ask 
100 individuals, about 11 of them will say that they think Warsaw is the capital of the 
Soviet Union. Therefore, this provides an 11 percent chance that Warsaw is the capital of 
the Soviet Union! 
To come back to the topic of Kremlinology, it is always with us and one of the 
reasons it does not work too well is that we do not have all the necessary information. Not 
only do we not know, but members of the Politburo themselves do not know which way 
they are going to jump tomorrow. I am certain that if one had asked Mikhail S. 
Solomentsev about the future course of development of the Politburo he would not have 
had a clue. He was also waiting to see how the political wind blew. 
The traditional methods which I used in Power and Policy in the USSR were based 
on deductions from various indicators. Some of them are quite simple, like the order in 
which Politburo members lined up on Lenin 's tomb and the number of constituencies 
allegedly seeking to "elect" various leaders to the Supreme Soviet. These have always been 
reliable signs. The complete unity of any leadership is a myth and one can always find or 
seek differences of emphasis and even policy differences. 
Then, of course, there is the clue provided by the promotion or demotion of a lesser 
figure associated with a given leader. Here, we have to exercise care, because if a group 
comes to Moscow, say from Moldavia or an even smaller area, then its members probably 
all constitute one group. If a couple of persons come from the Leningrad region , they may 
or may not be members of a single group, since such an important, heavily populated Party 
stronghold is more likely to be divided into competing factions. Such factors one must 
always consider. The other phenomenon , which does not bode well for quantifiers in 
"political science," is that individuals change sides. Consider, for instance , the famous 
case of 1957, involving Khrushchev's erstwhile protege, Dmitri T. Shepilov, who was 
- ------
singled out by Khrushchev, when the lattter denounced his opponents in the "Anti-Party" 
group, always adding "and Shepilov who joined them." 
Another point to keep in mind is that political leaders who have strongly visible 
political characteristics, like Khrushchev, are fairly easy to associate with specific 
positions. While Brezhnev was the General Secretary, I focused mainly on pre-Brezhnev 
events, while Michel Tatu worked on the Brezhnev period itself. The latter seemed much 
more difficult to me, because Soviet leaders were almost indistinguishable from one 
another during Brezhnev's tenure. Of course, the top leadership was continually having 
rows and individuals kept being ousted. But it was much more difficult to determine the 
factional lines , than during the pre-Brezhnev period. Now it is becoming easier again. 
And we are back to reasonably well defined political personalities in Moscow. 
I presume that no one minds very much when there are arguments about 
Kremlinology. It is not a very sensitive subject, although an interesting and useful one. 
But the more central issues of Soviet history and of the Stalinist terror do still arouse 
hostility, and not only among old Moscow Stalinists. There is the notion that Stalin was 
really naughty, but did not kill millions of human beings because of two factors: One is 
that it was an unreasonable thing to do; the other is that the evidence for Stalin's terror 
comes from prejudiced and dubious sources. 
The first question, pertaining to Stalin's actions and whether they are reasonable, is 
where many go wrong. I was reading Jerry Hough's reedition of Merle Fainsod's work, 
originally called How Russia is Ruled. Hough asserts that it is impossible for two or three 
million Soviet citizens to have been executed or to have died in Stalinist camps between 
1936 and 1938 because this would have affec ted an "improbably" large number of adult 
males. The answer is : "Yes, they were killed." It is now more or less confirmed. And it 
was an unreasonable number. But what is "unreasonable"? How does one define it? 
Unreasonable for Hough is not unreasonable for Stalin. Then one gets the argument that 
Stalin could not have organized the killing of millions of peasants in 1933 because it would 
have been counter-productive. I remember an academic saying that to me and I responded, 
"Well, do you know that Tamarlane built a pyramid of70,000 skulls outside Isfahan? He 
could not have done that, could he?" (Obviously it had to be economically self-defeating) . 
In the Ukraine during the 1930s, 15 or 20 percent of the peasantry were killed. But similar 
massacres had been committed by conquerors throughout history. It is called "laying 
waste". There is nothing strange or odd about it, but one has to have some background in 
general history to comprehend it. One has to assume that Stalin was not the moral 
equivalent of Calvin Coolidge. 
The second objection heard is that the evidence regarding the Stalinist purge of the 
1930s was prejudiced or dubious. These are two separate arguments. One is that persons 
who say that Stalin killed a lot of human beings are anti-Stalinist. If you are anti-Stalinist 
you are prejudiced. So, on that basis, one could argue that no prosecution case can ever be 
true. If anyone prosecutes a criminal the case must be dismissed because the prosecution's 
case cannot be valid. That is the rough argument. It has been put not only against myself. 
Khrushchev too was anti-Stalinist, therefore he had an axe to grind. The answer, of 
course, is that all evidence is given by individuals and all individuals have opinions . Of 
course, some evidence might be false . I have seen stories about Stalin which, I am certain, 
are false. I am told he did not ever really say that "you've got to shoot Russians, otherwise 
they won't die, because they live to be 95" (like Kaganovich). This is a slander on Stalin, I 
mu st admit. But the evidence has to be treated on its own merit. This applies to all 
history, not only to Stalin. Our evidence for practically all ancient, medieval, and much 
modern history depends on evidence "prejudiced" or secondary. 
Objections have been raised that some of our evidence is second-hand and 
unconfirmed (for obvious reasons) by official or other sources. True, in court we do not 
permit circumstantial evidence, but of course we admit it in history . Courts let out 
individuals whom everybody, the judge and the jury, know to be guilty. They are let off 
on one technicality or another. If they were being judged by history they would not be let 
-- ---- . . 
off. Naturally, second-hand evidence has to be treated carefully and critically, but this 
applies to first-hand evidence as well. 
Those who reject evidence unconfirmed by official documents often do so because 
it may come from a victim of the labor camps. This is first-hand evidence, but it is 
unacceptable to some because it comes from a "prejudiced" source. It is extraordinary that 
while such evidence is dismissed and laid aside, the "official evidence" is taken seriously. 
Yet, we know that official evidence can be as prejudiced as it is possible for evidence to be. 
It is also known that it is at least in part falsified. Therefore, we actually have more 
reasonable cause for doubting "official evidence," even when it is uncontradicted by other 
sources. 
The propounders of these defenses of Stalin hate Gorbachev because what has been 
revealed recently in Moscow confirms the views we have taken over many years: not only 
I myself, but others before me, for instance Leonard Shapiro, and others. 
The latest revelation involved an official report to Stalin by the Soviet minister of 
State Security in 1952. It stated that there were twelve million in the labor camps and that 
there were twenty million peasants listed as belonging to the families of "enemies of the 
people," still surviving after they had been sentenced in the early 1930s. These are the sort 
of figures that are coming out now . In Moscow the number of Stalin's victims is routinely 
put as between ten and twenty million; yet, I have heard in this country and in Holland the 
figure of twenty thousand being put forward. However, it was perfectly clear already 
thirty years ago that such was not the case. And now it is being freely stated in l\loscow. 
Again, official circles in the Soviet Union are on the edge of identifying Stalin's role in 
Kirov's assassination, though it has not been stated ex cathedra. Let us be fair, however, 
there is now an official Soviet commission dealing with Stalinism and, according to 
Gorbachev, the preliminary report is to be published soon. 
The Soviet leaders are on the brink of saying more, it is just on the point of boiling 
over. Recently, fascinating details have been made available regarding Beria's 
----- --- -
interrogation after he was arrested in 1953. They show that one must not throw away 
hearsay or even dubious evidence. A Yugoslav student some seven or eight years ago 
found an account of Beria's interrogation in the Soviet archives. He was not supposed to 
get access to that particular file, but he received it in error and he wrote a book based on his 
discovery. His account and the version recently made available in Moscow are pretty much 
the same, as far as I can see, in almost every detail, except that the Yugoslav's study added 
Beria's report to the Politburo of the labor camp numbers at the end of 1938 (around 7 
million). 
From the Stalinist point of view (and from the point of view of persons who treat 
the terror period differently from the way I and many others would), the number of Stalin's 
victims matters enormously. If only a few thousand or a few tens of thousand victims 
were killed or imprisoned, then the terror was not necessarily the most important aspect of 
the 1930s. Many academic treatments of the period have been produced which consider the 
social, economic, and administrative changes as important. Nevertheless, they find efforts 
to deal with the issue of terror rather vulgar. 
But killing ten million odd peasants is, amongst other things, a social matter. 
Killing ten thousand persons does not attack the socie ty as a whole, while killing ten 
million does. It hits the society in the solar plexus. Having a quarter of the adult male 
population in the forced labor camps is not simply an economic phenomenon, though it is 
pm1ially an economic phenomenon. In the Party itself, killing off the bureaucracy, not just 
in the tens of thousands but the hundreds of thousands, killing off the whole ruling elite, 
straight down from the top, and replacing it by denouncers is more than a mere 
administrative change. It is a change of the very spirit of the administration, of the tone of 
the administration. 
To sum up , all the information given to us by the glasnost' writers destroys a whole 
way of thinking about the Soviet past. I think this is a positive factor because previous 
assumptions were based on a parochial inability to envisage a totally alien political culture. 
-· 
It was an expression of the view that the whole world is rather like us. Moreover, the new 
information demonstrates the absurdity of the old attitude towards evidence. Finally, the 
new revelations are positive because they show us which way is not going to lead us to 
true history and to the truth in general. 
